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1.  Introduction 
 
The European (un)employment problem has inspired millions of printed pages.  The 
consensus view emerged since the Eighties was that employment growth in Europe 
could be achieved only to the extent that labour market flexibility would increase in 
parallel.  The role of aggregate demand was played down inspite of the vast 
underutilization of human resources.  This view is now the object of  reconsideration.   
Since the mid Eighties, monetary policy in Europe was strongly restrictive (and pro-
cyclical), with interest rates at their highest in 1992 when growth was approaching 
zero and turning negative a year later.  The fiscal story confirms the restrictiveness 
of demand policy.   
 
Many recent studies indicate that the European labor markets are more flexible that 
conventional wisdom implies.  At any given moment many jobs are simultaneously 
created in segments of the economy and destroyed in others. The magnitude of job 
turnover is surprisingly similar across countries in Europe and in the USA, 
regardless of net employment growth. The rates of job creation and job destruction 
in Europe have been around 8 - 11% a year till the mid Eighties, and slightly higher 
from then on. In the USA they stand above 10%. 
                                                 
1 This is a revised version of a study that dates back to 1998.  Most of the revisions have been written 
while visiting  the Institute for Industrial and Labor Relations, Princeton University in the spring of 
2000, where I was given very generous hospitality.   I have benefited from comments received  after 
presentations of this version at Princeton and the IMF, Washington, D.C. , and of the previous version 
at Torino, Padova and Aarhus.  In particular, I  wish to thank  O. Ashenfelter, T. Atkinson, G. Bertola, 
U. Colombino, H. Farber, R. Freeman, M. Guell, W. Salverda, and U. Trivellato.   This research has 
been carried out also thanks to a grant by  MURST (1999).          2 
Analogously, the magnitude of workers' flows between employment and non-
employment, and within employment across firms, is huge also when net job 
creation is nil.  Each year one every three-four workers separates from his post in all 
the economies object of this study, and about the same number is associated to a 
new post. 
 
The limit of the studies on job and worker reallocation is that very little is said on the 
characteristics of the earnings structure, a strictly related argument. A natural line of 
explanation for the differences in the European and US labor markets is suggested 
in terms of simple demand and supply. In Europe, where labour markets are highly 
regulated, the exogenous shocks are borne mainly by the quantities (i.e. labor 
demand) because prices (wages) are not free to respond. In the USA, instead, the 
labour market quickly adjusts both on the quantity and on the price side. Thus 
turnover may be equally high on both sides of the Ocean, inspite of very different 
institutions. 
 
An increasingly important issue is whether it is possible to have flexibility and sound 
employment growth on the one hand,  without bearing the high costs associated to 
labor market flexibility on the other hand.  In much of the Western world a vast share 
of the hirings associated to recent job creation take the form of fixed time or 
temporary contracts, part-time positions, disguised forms of self-employment, work 
leasing, atypical contracts of various sorts, all aimed at reducing labour costs, 
making work flexible and increasingly precarious. At the same time employment 
protection is becoming progressively thinner in most EU member states.  The social 
costs of these developments are serious: increasing inequality and polarization 
between good jobs and bad jobs, high risk for many individuals of being trapped in 
the low tail of the earnings distribution, social exclusion. 
 
This study is a preliminary exploration on the extent of labor market segmentation in 
Europe and the United States, based on data of earnings mobility prepared for the 
OECD in the late Nineties.  Assessing segmentation is important for a balanced 
view on the pros-and-cons of labor market flexibility.   
The punch-line of this study is that the USA and certain European countries appear 
to be at the extremes of a hypothetical ranking of wage structures, which is, 
however, far from linear: in the USA coexist a great deal of earnings mobility and an 
important chunk of labor market segmentation of the least previledged;  in Italy, 
Germany and France earnings mobility is lower, but also the degree of 
segmentation is smaller than that found in the USA.  The UK is somewhat closer to 
the USA, France follows at distance, while at the opposite extreme stand Germany 
and Italy.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: par. 1 illustrates the methodology of this 
approach, and the main results are presented.   Par. 2  deals with possible 
implications of the steady-state distributions calculated from the earnings transition 
matrices.  Par. 3  discusses some open problems with the proposed framework.  
Par. 4 concludes. 
 
   3 
2. Earnings mobility and labor market segmentation 
2.1  The basic approach 
 
Earnings inequality is reported to have risen in several OECD countries in the last 
twenty years.
2  The explanation runs in terms of  upward shifting demand and rigid 
supply of  skilled personnel relative to the unskilled, coupled with excess supply of 
low-skill workers (fig.3).  Increasing pay inequality naturally leads on to the question 
of earnings mobility, for it matters whether particular individuals or groups are 
trapped in low-paid segments of the labour market or whether low pay is a transient 
phenomenon.
3  
Earnings mobility is sometimes used as a synonymous of wage flexibility (as in 
Atkinson, Bourgignon, Morrison, 1992. This definition is utilized by OECD, 
Employment Outlook, 1996).  Earnings mobility, however,  is a necessary condition 
for flexibility, not a sufficient one.  Indeed, zero earnings mobility is equivalent to a 
perfectly rigid wage structure.  Consider a general wage growth model like 
 
w(it) = f [X(t), w(i,t-1)] + u(it) 
 
where X is a vector of exogenous variables, and  u is  i.i.d. with finite variance.  If 
var(u) = 0  (we are back to perfect wage rigidity), there will be no earnings mobility, 
as all individuals preserve their ranking in the wage distribution throughout their life.  
The larger the residual variance, the smaller the number of individuals who stay put. 
Thus wage rigidity and earnings mobility are negatively correlated, with high wage 
rigidity leading to low earnings mobility. 
4 
The measurement of earnings mobility has not received as much theoretical 
attention as has the measurement of inequality, and there is no real consensus on 
what is the most appropriate measure. 
 
Longitudinal data are essential for the estimation of earnings mobility. These may be 
either retrospective or panel and each has particular problems of its own.  Panel 
data sets raise a number of problems. First, the data only become available over 
relatively few years and the number of observations over time may be relatively 
                                                 
2 Among others:  P. Gottschalk and T.M. Smeeding, "Cross-national comparisons of earnings and 
income inequality", Journal of Economic Literature, vol.XXXV, 1997.  
3 Here we deal with intra-generational earnings mobility. Sociologists are usually more interested in 
social mobility, i.e. inter-generational mobility, an argument that would deserve a lot more of attention 
also by economists.  With the data currently at hand, this is, unfortunately, out of reach.  
 
4 The wage-age profile may be steeply rising where tenure and experience are highly valued, and / or 
where the unions effectively protect their members.  But neither will - per se -  affect the variance of the 
profile.  An increasingly larger variance around the mean age-wage profile (one form of 
heteroskedasticity) may be expected if the human capital accumulated via tenure and experience is not 
firm-specific, but transferable across firms. Also, if the distribution of initial endowment of basic skills in 
the working population is widely dispersed (if X(i,t) has a large cross-i- variance), the variance around 
the wage-age profile will increase in age, reflecting the fact that the most endowed persons will climb 
the occupational ladder, and the least fortunate will be kept in the humblest jobs all their life. 
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limited. Second, there is the problem of attrition, which will cause the size of the 
panel to decline over time and possibly result in attrition bias.  
 
The features of earning mobility in some countries of continental Europe and the 
USA can be explored on the bases of transition matrices recently gathered by 
OECD.  
The OECD data relate to earning mobility of dependent workers in the 1985-91 
period, with the exclusion of self-employment, the public sector and agriculture.  
There are three data sources: household surveys of individual workers (USA, 
Germany); establishment surveys yielding also worker histories (UK); administrative 
data-bases (Italy and France, both from Social Security archives). Administrative 
sources usually cover the whole population (as in France) or very large random 
samples (as in Italy, where the sampling ratio is 1:90).   
I have used the full (6 x 6) matrices - the states being the five income brackets 
around the median + one state corresponding to "part-time work" (except for Finland 
where part time work is not observable). 
My comments will be confined to the earnings mobility of full-time wage and salary 
workers only, as this is the only easy  way to insure comparability.  
 
My initial hypothesis is that there the USA and continental Europe differ in two 
respects: (i) upward and downward earning mobility of the relatively better off-
fraction of the work-force is higher in the USA than in the European countries; (ii) 
labor markets segmentation in the low tail of the earning distribution is  higher in the 
USA than in continental Europe. 
If the lifetime earning profile of a dependent worker were completely predetermined, 
she/he would be trapped in the same relative position of the wage distribution where 
he/she began his/her career.  As a consequence, all transition probabilities P(s,s), 
for any state  s = 1,2 ... S, would be equal to 1, even if individuals differed at the 
beginning of their career. Likewise any immobility indicator would be equal to 1. 
If our prior hypothesis includes segmentation of some sort, it becomes important to 
distinguish at which end of the earnings distribution immobility prevails. Persistence 
in the low tail of the distribution may or may not go hand-in-hand with persistence in 
the upper tail. Looking at overall immobility ratios may be very misleading if 
segmentation is an important issue, as it averages out differences where they 
should instead emerge.  Italy, Denmark, UK and USA look almost identical, while - 
as will be clear in what follows - they are very different.
5 
 
A very simple method to pursue this line consists in contrasting two immobility 
indicators, one computed in a partition of North-West cells of the transition matrix 
(denoting persistence in low earnings), the other in a partition of South-East cells 
(denoting persistence in high earnings).  I have chosen to contrast the probability  
P(1,1) of persisting in the first earning band (less than 0.65 * median) in the five-year 
                                                 
5 The standard immobility ratio calculated from OECD 1986-91 data yield the following results: 
 France   0.72   UK   0.63 
 Germany 0.70   USA   0.64 
 Danmark 0.62   Italy   0.66 
which look all but particularly evokative. 
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period 1986-91, with the immobility index (IM2) calculated from the diagonal in the 
remaining (4 x 4) matrix, i.e.
6    
 
IM2 = [P(2,2) + P(3,3) + P(4,4) + P(5,5)] / 4. 
 
The following results are obtained
7  (F1 – in the third column of Table 5 - stands for 
the share of low-paid workers on all full-time employees in 1986). 
 
Table 1 Indicators of immobility (and segmentation) 
 All  workers  male  Female 
  P(1,1) IM2  F1  P(1,1) IM2  F1  P(1,1) IM2  F1 
USA 55.8 42.5 27.5 45.4 41.3 16.7 62.5 43.0 42.2 
FR  31.6 62.9 11.0 22.7 62.2   7.9  39.7 63.3 39.8 
IT  21.8 60.8 10.0 15.7 60.5   6.9  27.9 59.2 16.1 
UK  39.0 50.2 17.7 29.2 49.6   9.5  45.6 52.7 34.6 
GER  26.0 61.3 18.7 15.4 61.4 10.7 33.7 58.6 35.9 
DNK  8.1 56.8  6.0 6.5 55.9  3.6 9.0 52.8  9.6 
FIN  36.9 47.9 14.3 42.1 47.3 10.7 33.5 42.9 18.3 
SWE  15.4 65.5 4.2  9.1  63.0 2.6  20.0 70.0 7.7 
 
The contrast is strikingly clear: while P(1,1) is much higher for the USA than for the 
European countries, IM2 is instead lower. 
Gross as IM2 may be, it unequivocally points at the fact that upward and downward 
mobility is higher in the USA for all, except for the least fortunate earners. For the 
latter, instead, the chance of improving their relative position is very slim in the USA, 
and somewhat better in Europe. The contrast between   P(1,1) and  IM2  strongly 
denotes the existence of labour market segmentation. 
The extent of segmentation in the USA is shown also by the fraction of low-paid 
workers in the 1986-wage distribution (F1): 27.5% of the USA full-time dependent 
workers earn less than 0.65*median, six times the corresponding fraction of Sweden 
and Denmark, two-and-a-half times that of France and Italy, one-and-a-half times 
that of Germany and the U.K.  The figure for Germany may look surprisingly high, 
but it is not: German youth enters employment at the end of the dual education and 
                                                 
6 Here and in what follows I will refer to transitions across earning bands around the median, as 
defined by the OECD. There is a strong methodological drawback in making use of transitions across 
percentiles (deciles). It can be proved (Revelli, 1997) that, under rather general conditions on the 
underlying model of individual wage growth, the transition probabilities across percentiles of the 
earning distribution are independent from the variance of the process. This annihilates almost all of the 
expected differences among countries, thus making comparisons quite difficult. 
7 A distance (Euclidean metric) between the transition matrices may also be computed. This too hides 
the contrast found between mobility and labor market segmentation. It yields the following matrix of 
distances, which confirms the ranking with the USA and Germany/Italy at the opposite extremes: 
 USA  FR  IT  UK  GER 
USA  0  0.023 0.026 0.013 0.024 
FR   0  0.008  0.013  0.006 
IT     0  0.015  0.007 
UK     0  0.014 
GER      0 
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training system at low entry pay, but destined to catch up in few years. Interestingly,  
F1 of female workers is comparable, except for Italy: here the difference is due to 
the scarce diffusion of part-time work, and, consequently, the lower female 
partecipation.  
These results are not  independent from the dispersion of the earnings distributions, 
which differs widely from country to country. Take, for example, the Swedish record 
of enormous compression of relative wages under centralized “solidarity” bargaining 
(broken down only in the mid Nineties): in the Eighties the Swedish hourly wage 
distribution was so dense that a relative wage increase of 30% was enough to carry 
a worker from the lowest decile of the blue-collar distribution all the way to the 
highest. A parallel move in the U.K. would have required a relative increase of more 
than 200%, and for a US manufacturing employee over 400%.
8 
 
2.2  A closer inspection by age-group 
 
Table 5 may raise doubts on the grounds that the earnings transition matrices for all 
age groups pooled together, as those utilized above, may hide composition effects: 
transition probabilities of young workers differ substantially from those of adult and 
aged people. Unless the age distribution of the sample populations is pretty much 
the same in all countries under observation, the indications of table 5 could be 
distorted.  As tab. 6  shows, the age distributions are indeed quite different. Two 
distributions are displayed here: that of full-time wage and salary workers (FTW), 
and that of the whole OECD samples (ALL). The two may differ if the original 
sample is one of workers only (as in Italy,  France and UK) or if it is representative of 
a population less restrictively defined (as in USA and Germany). 
 
Table 6 
Age  distribution  (1986)  of full-time wage and salary workers (FTW) and of the complete sample 
populations  (ALL) 
 
 USA   ITA  FRA  U.K.    GER   
age 
groups  FTW  ALL FWT ALL FWT ALL FWT  ALL  FWT  ALL 
<  25  10  11 23 30 17 29 22  24  22  20 
25-34  30  26 29 27 33 29 24  24  25  21 
35-49  40  37 36 31 33 29 33  34  34  32 
50-64  20  26 12 12 17 13 21  18  19  27 
  100  100 100 100 100 100 100  100  100  100 
 
I have, therefore, gone back to the transition matrices for four different age groups, 




                                                 
8 D.A.Hibbs and H. Locking,  JOLE, Oct. 2000, 
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Table 7  
age       15-24           25-34           35-49             50-64               // 
 P 
(1,1) 
IM2 F2    P 
(1,1) 
IM2 F2    P 
(1,1) 
IM2 F2    P 
(1,1) 
IM2 F2   F2 
all 
usa  47.9  27.0  27.2   40.4  42.9 17.7   61.6  42.7  13.2   59.9  36.0  6.8   15.4 
fra  18.0  34.2  8.0   26.4  53.7  6.0   27.5  61.6  3.9   30.3  57.3  5.3   5.9 
ita  13.1  39.2  13.2   21.4  55.4  6.1   32.7  63.3  5.0   44.7  62.7  6.0   7.9 
uk  23.6  35.8  21.3   35.6  44.8  5.8   47.6  52.9  12.8   55.4  49.4  8.0   9.8 
ger  16.7  31.8  27.7   16.7  54.1  5.6   41.5  63.8  3.2   73.7  19.3  2.6   8.3 
fin      19.1      10.4       8.0       6.4   11.4 
dk      11.2       3.1       1.2       0.8   3.6 
 
The wage distributions 1986 and 1991 from which I derive table 6 are the original 
distributions for all age groups together, and not the distributions specific of each 
age group. If such were not the case, little  could be said to either strengthen or 
weaken our previous conclusions.   Notice, for instance, that persistence in low pay, 
described by  P(1,1), is increasing in age in all the European countries (less so in 
the USA),  an indication that mobility is highest at young age and decreases as life 
goes on.  Age-specific transition matrices would not reveal this pattern. 
The new indications are very similar to those seen already.  As before,  and in all but 
the oldest age group,  P(1,1) - stickiness in low pay - is much higher in the USA than 
in the European countries, while IM2 - the complement of which  (1 - IM2) denotes 
mobility outside the low-pay end of the earnings distribution - is instead lower.   
Among the European countries, the U.K. looks, here again, the closest to  North 
America.  Evidence of labor market segmentation in the USA, compared to 
continental Europe, is strongly confirmed.     
In the 50-64 age group Germany is the exception: persistence is higher at the 
bottom of the distribution, while there is a lot  more mobility in the remaining portion.  
In Germany, however,  F2, the 1986-share of people in low pay, is only 3.2 at age 
35-49, and 2.6 at  age 50-64, much lower than in the remaining countries.  I shall 
return to the case of Germany in the next paragraph.  
 
 
2.3  Additional insight on upward and downward mobility 
A different facet of segmentation is illustrated by Table 8.  It reports the ratio of two 
probabilities: that of moving up (from any of the five bands around the median) to 
that of moving down.  
Table 7   P(up)/P(down) from any origin 
 15-24  24-34  35-49  >50 
USA  6.63 3.33 1.02 0.83 
UK  7.23 2.50 1.19 0.63 
France  4.32 2.59 1.16 0.69 
Italy  3.14 2.33 1.65 1.27 
Denmark  3.40 1.73 1.19 0.61 
Finland  1.95 1.28 0.68 0.48 
Germany(a)  13.37  2.48 0.92 0.38 
Sweden(a)  9.50 2.19 1.25 0.33 
Source: Our calculations on OECD transition matrices.   
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(a) Results for Germany and Sweden may not be very significant, due to the low 
number of observations in each cell. 
 
For the young in USA and UK, the frequency of upward mobility is about seven 
times that of downward mobility (the ratio is even higher in Germany and Sweden, 
but sample size may not be sufficiently large to insure strong significance).  On the 
other hand, in Finland it is less than twice, in Italy only three times as large. 
Not surprisingly, the ratio declines as age increases.  
If we turn to oldest workers (> 50), we would expect the ratio  P(up) / P(down)  to be 
less than one. We find this to hold in all countries, with the exception of Italy. Where 
the exit from the labour market is judiciously smoothed by transitions from full-time, 
full-responsibility positions  to various forms of part-time, flex-time work, the ratio is 
low (Germany and Sweden in first place, where, again, there may be a problem with 
statistical significance). In Italy the ratio is pathologically high - notice that it is by far 
the highest also in the 35-49 age bracket -  denoting, on the one hand the absence 
of instruments aimed at smoothing the transition from employment into non-
employment, and on the other the excessive protection of escalator-type clauses  
and/or  the diffused free-rider malpractice of increasing pay just before retirement 
age, in order to secure higher pensions 
9  
 
Additional insight on the flexibility-rigidity of earning structures may be obtained by 
looking at selected transition probabilities from the full (6 x 6) matrices for each age 
group – the states being five income brackets around the median + one state 
corresponding to “part-time work”. Caution must be exercised in order to avoid 
considering transition probabilities that are linearly dependent
10 
 
Comparisons by age group are made across five countries (FRA, FIN, ITA, UK, 
USA): other countries (GER, SWE, DK)  have low significance at less than the 
aggregate level. P(a,b) denotes here the probability of moving from state (a) to state 
(b) in the 1986-91 observation period.  All the original transition probabilities have 
been recalculated on the closed sample of individuals who are  present in the 1986-
91 period, in order to insure homogeneity across countries (not all states - for 
instance, unemployment, retirement, military service - are observed everywhere).    
A word of caution in reading these numbers:  attrition is not a random event, and it is 
high.  Thus the probability of exiting the panel for dependent workers is large   
(above 30% in Italy and Germany, over two three-year periods 1986-89 and 1991-
94) and inversely related to pay levels.
11  Hence upwards mobility is likely to be 
overestimated and downwards mobility underestimated.  
  
Nonetheless, interesting evidence emerges especially looking at downward mobility.  
From the transition matrices (of all age groups pooled together), I have selected one 
                                                 
9 Until 1993 Italian pensions were tied to pay at the end of one's career. Today, after the recent partial 
reforms of the Social Security System, it is proportional to average pay in the last ten years at work. 
 
10 If P(i,j)  is very high, then  P(i,k) - for any  k=/= j  -  will be very small, as each row sums to one. 
 
11 Cfr.  B. Contini, L. Pacelli, C. Villosio  "Short employment spells in Italy, Germany and UK: testing the 
port-of-entry hypothesis",  CEP  Working Paper n. 26 (1999).   9 
case of drastic fall in the wage distribution, from highest to lowest  - P(5,1) -  and 
three cases of less severe, but not insignificant  setback – P(5,3), P(3,1) and P(4,2).  
Not surprisingly,  the probabilities of drastic setback are much lower than the others. 
 
There is one finding common to all: at old age (> 50) the probability of downward 
mobility is highest in the USA and lowest in Italy.  Among the European countries 
Finland and the UK come close to the USA, while France is not far from Italy at the 
other extreme.  To a lesser extent, the same pattern holds also among adults  (35-
49).  If downward mobility is low at mature age, the immediate implication is that 
predetermination in the pay structure of dependent workers is high.  We have here 
another strong hint of the rigidity of the pay structure in Italy and France, compared 
to the flexibility in Finland and UK, and across the Ocean, of the USA. 
The correlation refers to full-time workers only. If we could include part-time workers 
in the analysis, the result would probably be strengthened.  This finding from a 
simple bivariate association, although interesting in its own right, should be taken 
 
with care: in no way does it imply a causal relation between the two 
phenomena, which could go in both directions.    
 
Figure 1 is also of some interest here
12: it shows the relation between the share of 
employed aged>55 and the probability of a downward movement from each position 
in the wage distribution for workers aged 50-64 during the five-year 1986-1991. The 
graph shows a strong cross-sectional correlation, suggesting that aged people stay 
at work especially in countries where earnings decline at the end of one’s career.   
Table 2 Downward earnings mobility among mature and old workers  
Country Age  group  P(5,1)  P(5,3)  P(3,1)  P(4,2) 
ITALY >  50  .00  .03  .02  .05 
 35-49  .00  .03  .01  .03 
          
FRANCE >  50 .01  .03  .05  .05 
 35-49  .01  .03  .02  .03 
          
U.K. >  50  .02  .08  .04  n.g. 
 35-49  .01  .07  .02  .05 
          
FINLAND >  50  .08  .07  .10  .08 
 35-49  .04  .07  .06  .07 
          
U.S.A. >  50  .09  .14  .10  .07 
 35-49  .08  .07  .07  .09 






                                                 
12 Fig. 1 and 2 are taken from B. Contini and C. Villosio,  Analysis of Wage flexibility and mobility,   
Report for E.C., DG V (1999).    10 
Figure 1 Share of workers aged 55 and over  (on total employment) vs. 




































The next graph, of similar nature, shows the relation between the share of older 
workers and that of short duration jobs (percentage of workers aged 46-60 in jobs 
lasting less than 1 year). The relation is weaker than the previous one, but it 
suggests the existence of positive correlation between old workers employment and 
the frequency of short-time contracts. This too provides some support to the 
hypothesis that flexible labour market relations (proxied here by short duration jobs) 
may help the transition from work to retirement. 
 
Figure 2 Share of workers (male) aged 55 and over  vs. the percentage of short 
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Upwards earnings mobility among young workers is investigated by looking at three 
transition probabilities:  P(1,3), P(2,4) and P(4,5).  Here we find some confirmation 
of our previous hypothesis on the extent of labor market segmentation in North 
America vis-à-vis Europe: (i) leaving the lowest end of the wage distribution for 
young workers (15-24 and 24-34)  is easier in Europe, especially in Italy and 
Finland;  (ii)  moving upwards towards the highest tail of the distribution is a very 
likely event in North America, especially among the youngest; in Europe it is not 




Table 3 Upwards earning mobility among young and prime-age workers 
Country Age  group  P(1,3)  P(2,4)  P(4,5) 
ITALY 15-24  .15  .05  .19 
 24-34  .17  .05  .38 
        
France 15-24  .12  .05  .34 
 24-34  .09  .03  .33 
        
U.K. 15-24  .18  .13  .34 
 24-34  .10  .10  .41 
        
FINLAND 15-24  .19  .09  .19 
 24-34  .18  .06  .28 
        
U.S.A. 15-24  .09  .16  .64 
 24-34  .08  .09  .51 
Source: Our calculation on OECD transition matrices provided by OECD 
 
3.  Any implication from the steady-state distributions ? 
The representation of wage dynamics by means of one-period transition matrices is 
simple and  convenient. Nor does it imply, in itself, the assumption that wage 
dynamics is governed by a Markov process.  Multi-period dynamics and steady-
state equilibrium are immediately evoked as transition matrices are at hand.  Is this 
a reasonable association  ?  Aside from the usual Markovian hypotheses that must 
be satisfied, there is one crucial pre-requisite: the age distribution of the population 
from which transition probabilities are computed should be in demographic 
equilibrium, with young workers systematically replacing the old, retiring,  ones.  
We have seen already that the age distribution of full-time wage and salary workers   
differs in the two sides of the Ocean.  In addition,  as is (known to be)  the case for 
many European countries, the observation period over which earnings mobility is 
measured is one of ageing population and work force (1986-91).  It is easy to predict 
that, as time is allowed to flow, the wage distribution will shift to the right, i.e. there 
will be more people in upper tail of the wage distribution,  and less in the lower tail.  
It is immediate to see that this is, indeed, the case, in the European countries. I 
display  here  the 1986 and 1991 wage distributions, as well as a pseudo steady-
state earnings distribution, on the meaning of which I  return immediately 
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.EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION: PSEUDO STEADY-STATE  
VS. 1986 AND 1991 
   
       
 ALL         
 Less 0.65  0.65 to 0.95  0.95 to 1.25  1.25 to 1.55  1.55 + 
USA        
1986  24.19% 20.27% 17.92%  14.08% 23.55% 
1991  22.25% 20.35% 18.09%  13.93% 25.37% 
S.S.  17.05% 17.89% 17.52%  14.88% 32.67% 
FRANCIA        
1986  7.55% 32.74% 27.76%  13.43% 18.53% 
1991  7.10% 29.54% 27.81%  14.23% 21.31% 
S.S.  3.90% 17.49% 22.07%  16.14% 40.40% 
ITALIA        
1986  7.03% 29.08% 36.40%  16.08% 11.42% 
1991  3.57% 31.00% 32.36%  16.56% 16.50% 
S.S.  1.79% 19.84% 23.09%  16.50% 38.79% 
UK        
1986  14.43% 26.39% 24.58%  16.06% 18.55% 
1991  10.72% 26.11% 23.10%  17.62% 22.45% 
S.S.  4.64% 17.07% 20.45%  19.97% 37.86% 
GERMANIA        
1986  13.45% 26.44% 32.15%  13.40% 14.56% 
1991  7.27% 27.75% 31.69%  16.10% 17.19% 
S.S.  2.59% 14.79% 25.45%  20.30% 36.87% 
       
 
  M A L E       
 Less 0.65  0.65 to 0.95  0.95 to 1.25  1.25 to 1.55  1.55 + 
U S A        
1986  15.51% 17.72% 18.80% 16.72% 31.24% 
1991  14.54% 18.07% 17.67% 15.82% 33.90% 
S.S.  13.47% 16.94% 16.46% 15.42% 37.71% 
F R A N C I A        
1986  5.50% 29.04% 27.97% 14.27% 23.21% 
1991  4.35% 26.17% 28.28% 14.86% 26.34% 
S.S.  2.51% 15.15% 21.53% 15.68% 45.13% 
ITALIA       
1986  5.03% 22.93% 38.34% 19.25% 14.46% 
1991  1.98% 25.20% 34.10% 18.52% 20.21% 
S.S.  1.01% 16.47% 23.78% 16.96% 41.79% 
U K        
1986  8.19% 21.93% 26.50% 19.13% 24.24% 
1991  5.82% 21.95% 24.62% 18.97% 28.64% 
S.S.  3.96% 17.35% 21.81% 19.13% 37.75% 
G E R M A N I A        
1986  7.74% 23.02% 35.85% 15.66% 17.74% 
1991  2.53% 23.48% 33.61% 18.53% 21.85% 
S.S.  0.99% 12.41% 23.70% 20.37% 42.53%   13 
 
 
     
  FEMALE      
 Less 0.65  0.65 to 0.95  0.95 to 1.25  1.25 to 1.55  1.55 + 
U S A        
1986  37.94% 24.29% 16.52%  9.89% 11.36% 
1991  33.51% 23.67% 18.71% 11.18% 12.93% 
S.S.  22.15% 20.19% 20.97% 14.55% 22.14% 
F R A N C I A        
1986  11.45% 39.79% 27.34% 11.83%  9.59% 
1991  12.06% 35.61% 26.97% 13.10% 12.27% 
S.S.  7.22% 23.27% 23.79% 17.66% 28.07% 
ITALIA       
1986  11.85% 43.92% 31.72%  8.43%  4.09% 
1991  7.37% 44.81% 28.24% 11.91%  7.67% 
S.S.  4.10% 30.58% 22.45% 15.86% 27.01% 
U K        
1986  29.82% 37.40% 19.83%  8.47%  4.49% 
1991  21.15% 34.97% 19.87% 14.75%  9.25% 
S.S.  4.76% 12.65% 12.56% 24.01% 46.02% 
G E R M A N I A        
1986  29.09% 35.80% 22.03%  7.23%  5.85% 
1991  19.30% 38.59% 26.80%  9.95%  5.36% 
S.S.  9.13% 25.54% 35.96% 16.55% 12.81% 
 
Source: our calculations on transition matrices provided by OECD 
 
Employment outflows are observed  in the OECD panels, but inflows are not: in 
particular, the replacement of young work-force  in place of the retiring (or otherwise 
withdrawing) old is missed altogether. This is seen by comparing the 1986 and 1991 
earning distributions: the weight of the left-most wage bracket decreases and the 
weight of the top one increases everywhere. 
The transition matrices are defined over a five-year period 1986-91. In order for the 
limit distribution to be meaningful, the same transition matrix must apply as time 
moves on.  For this to hold, the stability of  the age distribution is necessary:  more 
precisely, the process of demographic replacement (young vs. old) must preserve 
the age composition at the beginning of each five-year period.  This being the case, 
a representation of earnings dynamics in terms of simple Markov chains, without 
explicit modelling of the entry-exit process,  will not hinder the interpretation of the 
limit distribution.  I have already pointed out that this may not be the case. 
Accordingly, I  call the latter a pseudo limit distribution, that yields, with all necessary 
caveats, additional insight on the differences between Europe and USA:  the pseudo 
steady-state of the EU-countries is heavily displaced toward the right, with less 
weight in the lowest and central brackets, and much more in the highest.  For the 
USA, instead, the 1991 earnings distribution  (especially male earnings) is quite 
similar to the pseudo limit distribution.  This is an additional confirmation that in 
Europe today's age structure of the work-force is  in a traverse, ageing at rather 
quick pace. In the USA, instead, the 1991 distribution is closer to its long run   14 
equilibrium.  The latter is flat compared to those of Europe (17% of the working 
population confined in the lowest tail,  whereas in Europe  it varies between 2% and 
5%). This is not surprising: if the segmentation hypothesis is grounded and if the 
initial endowments of skills and innate abilities in the working population is the same 
on both sides of the Ocean, we would expect many of the least priviledged to remain 
such all their life in the USA, while in Europe a larger fraction will benefit from the 




4.  Open problems (nearly all, not all, measurement problems) 
 
In this paper I propose a very simple and  rough set of indicators of labor market 
segmentation. Much more remains to be done in order to have a clean picture  of 
this phenomenon.  I will briefly mention some of the complicated measurement 
problems that will have to be addressed in the next future. 
 
4.1  In some EU - countries, especially of Southern Europe, labour market 
segmentation is hidden in the black economy, which develops also, although not 
only, as a reaction to tight regulation and high taxation.  There, flexibility of earnings 
and of working hours is total, employment protection is nil. Statistical indicators are 
inadequate to trace it. Thus in countries like Italy, Spain, Greece (and others too) 
labour market flexibility is higher than statistics show, with inequality and labour 
market segmentation being, with all likelihood, higher too. 
 
The increasing degree of labour market flexibility and deregulation in Europe 
pose additional problems per se.  To the extent that we may not be in a position to 
observe earnings and tenure related to many of the new flexible jobs, the 
measurement of earnings mobility may be distorted.  A vast share of new hirings 
takes the form of fixed time or temporary contracts, part-time positions, disguised 
forms of self-employment, work leasing, atypical contracts of various sorts, all aimed 
at reducing labour costs and making work flexible.   Do the data at hand catch all 
these new forms ?  In some countries they probably do, but in some they certainly 
don’t.  Italy is one example, but certainly not the only one.  Where the data originate 
from administrative sources some atypical forms of work may not be officially 
reported. This being the case, the measurement of earnings mobility is distorted, 
with all likelihood in the direction of underestimating persistence in low pay and 
overestimating upwards mobility. 
 
4.2  These arguments help to explain an interesting and not-so-obvious cross-
sectional relation between  the extent of labor market segmentation  [measured by:  
s  =  P(1,1) -  IM2.   This is a  rough indicator: the higher s, the extent of  LM-
                                                 
13 There is an additional problem that may cloud the issue here:  the states of the original transition 
matrices 1986-91  are defined as bands around the median of the earnings distribution in 1986 (origin) 
and 1991 (destination).   As we look into the dynamics of the process, it would be appropriate to have 
the states redefined each five-year period  (i.e.,  after one iteration, the states ought to be bands around 
the median in 1991 (origin)  and in 1996 (destination); and so on after  n  iterations ).   As we compute 
the pseudo-limit distribution, instead, the states are always those defined over the 1986-91 observation 
period.  This has no drawbacks only if the (real) wage distribution is stable over time.     15 
segmentation (as defined  here), the higher the employment / population ratio  (E/P), 
a highly stable indicator of labor market performance at large.   We find a positive 
relation (with two Scandinavian outliers, Denmark and Sweden):  in the USA, 
followed by UK and Finland,  LM-segmentation is high, and so is  E/P;  in continental 
Europe  (Italy, France, Germany) LM-segmentation is low, and so is E/P. The 
position of  Denmark and Sweden may be largely explained by the incidence of 
public expenditure in LM-programs as a percentage of GDP, which is  highest in this 
group of countries.   The positive relation found here between the extent of labor 
market segmentation and the employment-population ratio at large is in line with 
what I have previously pointed out  in relation to the cross-sectional association 
between downward earnings mobility at mature age and the share of aged peope at 
work (fig. 1).  Soft landing into retirement helps to keep people at work at the cost of 
some downward adjustment of their pay.  
 
If, we put the unemployment rate  (u)  in place of  E/P, we find - not surprisingly - a 
negative relation with  s  (with only Sweden as outlier).  My own preference is for  
E/P, because it is much less cyclically sensitive than  u, as is   s  itself.
 14   
 
This having said,  the morale of the story appears to be deceptively simple:  where 
(almost) everyone is at work,  there we'll find a great deal of  LM-segmentation:  in 
continental Europe fewer people are at work, and segmentation is not such a big 
problem;  in USA things go the other way.  
 
But there might be another, subtle, interpretation:  if  the measurement problems  
related to  (i) the black economy;  (ii)  the new flexible jobs,  are grounded,  it means 
that - for different reasons - there exist in some European economies many jobs that 
statistics fail to catch.  A vast majority of them are "bad" jobs, with scarce 
perspectives of upwards mobility.  If they entered the employment count, we would 
see a higher  E/P, and, I would guess,  a higher  s.   This amounts to say that the 
distance between the labor markets of continental Europe and that of the USA   
could be smaller than  the usual statistics lead us to believe. 
                                                 
14 By now several researchers have observed a trade-off between unemployment and wage 
inequality and indicate explanations not dissimilar to the one I propose here:  R.M. Blank 
(1997)  discusses a   “unified theory” of labor market outcomes,  where institutions and 
economic shocks interact to produce differing outcomes.   Bertola, Blau, Kahn  (Comparative 
Analysis of Labor Market Outcomes,  The Russel Sage Foundation,  2001)  suggest that 
where collective bargaining and LM institutions tend to reduce wage inequality,  this will 
effectively truncate the underlying distribution across individuals  and jobs,  eliminating 
employment opportunities for low-wage workers:   “... if unemployment primarily affects those 
at the bottom of the skill distribution, then there will be a mechanical positive relationship 
between unemployment  and the observed wage median”.    
C. Pissarides [ Scottish Journal of Economics (Sept. 1999)]  observes, instead, a trade-off between the 
increase in unemployment and  the increase in inequality in OECD countries in the late Eighties and 
early Nineties.  His explanation is more sophisticated and runs in different terms:  the combination of  
generous unemployment compensation systems (protecting mainly the low-skilled) and generous 
employment protection  (protecting mainly the skilled employees) will generate - in equilibrium - more 
unemployment inequality across skill groups, and less wage inequality.    
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4.3  In par. 2.3 I have already mentioned some problems related to attrition 
observable in panel data.  An additional problem, unrelated to attrition when the data 
originate from surveys on individuals, independent of their status in the labor force, 
very much related to attrition when the data come from certain administrative 
sources,  is   how to treat people who have no wage.  There is  quite a high turnover 
from one year to the next between those at the bottom of the wage distribution and 
the unemployed (the low-pay no-pay cycle).
15   The measures of P(1,1) – 
persistence in low pay -   utilized in this paper,  refer to individuals who are at work 
both in 1986 and in 1991, regardless of their position in between. Those who have 
become unemployed sometime after 1986 and are still unemployed in 1991 are not 
accounted for.  I have chosen to leave them out  altogether (to improve cross-
country comparability), although, in a few cases, the information could have been 
retrieved.  My choice is justified also by the fact that P(1,1) indicates persistence in 
low pay, and not persistence in low income.  
 
                                                 
15 I am grateful to S. Jenkins for reminding me of this problem.    17 
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P(1,1) IM2 S U Empl/Pop LM-Exp/GDP
USA 55,8 42,5 13,3 5,7 72,2 0,5
FR 31,6 62,9 -31,3 9,2 59,9 3,2
IT 21,8 60,8 -39 9,9 53,9 2,5
UK 39 50,2 -11,2 6,8 72,4 2,6
GER 26 61,3 -35,3 6,3 64,1 3,8
DNK 8,1 56,8 -48,7 8,5 75,4 6,6
FIN 36,9 47,9 -11 3,2 74,1 5,6





4.4  The observation periods  (here 5 years) may be too short to catch the true 
dynamics of earnings mobility.  Long transitions could be more appropriate.  Only in  
few instances, however,  do we have information on P(1,1) observed at long 
distance, let alone on other transition probabilities.  
 
P(1,1) observed over short and long time intervals  
  short transitions  (5 years)  long transitions 
USA    0.56  0.44          (17  years)  * 
Italy  0.22  0.17          (10 years)   ** 
Finland 0.37  0.26  (11  years) 
0.14          (21 years)   *** 
Denmark  0.08  0.10          (11 years)   *** 
 
* P. Gottschalk,  1999  ;  ** B. Contini et al. , 2000;  *** R. Asplund, P. Bingley, N. 
Westegaard- Nielsen, 1998. 
 
Long  persistence in low pay is  a lot higher in the USA as compared to Denmark, 
Finland (not surprisingly) and to Italy  (somewhat less obvious).  
 
4.5  Compensation policy. Where pay (often, but not always reserved to high 
management)  takes the form of stock options, the description of earnings dynamics 
restricted to monetary outlays becomes much weaker.   This may not be a diffused 










   19 
5.  Concluding remarks   
 
Recent years have produced a great deal of comparative research on the 
determinants of persistence in low pay [by and large,  focussed on  P(1,1)].  The 
results are surprisingly similar across European countries, as witnessed by 
numerous contributions of the LOWER network.   
Persistence in low pay is not sufficient for labor market segmentation, as defined 
here.  Segmentation implies that, while there has to be a large share of workers 
stuck in bad jobs or no job at all, there is, at the same time, a vast segment of 
working population that is very mobile, upwards or downwards, within one's own 
working life or across generations. The USA appears to provide the best example of 
a highly segmented labor market.     
Other forms of LM-segmentation are quite conceivable: for instance, one in which 
immobility prevails everywhere in the earnings distribution: the poor stay forever 
poor, the rich forever rich, no matter what they do.  Examples might be drawn from 
the Middle Age-economies, with landlords on one side, and serfs on the other, or - 
even today - from some Latin American or Asian countries run by ruthless 
authoritarian regimes.  Hopefully,  such examples should not be with us in Europe.  
  
Increasing inequality is not, in itself, sufficient to generate labor market 
segmentation.  It will do so, unless the possibility of enhancing one's human capital 
is guaranteed for all workers, either via public investment in education and training, 
or via private channels with finance made available to the more endowed as well as 
to the less endowed workers.   As of today,  we don’t know if increasing inequality 
has translated also into deeper labor market segmentation.   Long panel data 
necessary to observe trends of earnings mobility are not available.    
 
There are, however, reasons to believe that the extent of labor market segmentation 
may be increasing: 
 
1  policies aiming at helping entry of youth into employment.   Payroll tax 
rebates,  lower  firing costs (both  come together with fixed duration  - one or two-
year -  contracts)  increase the dualistic features of the labor market as firms find it 
advantageous to change the  mix of skilled / unskilled workforce in favor of the latter 
[cfr. Blanchard-Landier (2000); Boeri (1999); Contini et al. (1998)].  Worker turnover  
increases in parallel, and the incentives (by firms and workers)  to invest in human 
capital will be reduced.  Thus, while the  “good & lucky” workers may have better 
chances to enhance their human capital, the “bad” ones will not.  As a result, 
dualism - which could be, in principle, a transitory stage for the new entrants in the 
labor market - will consolidate into persistent segmentation.  
 
2  the e-economy is in its early stages, hi-tech, skilled-labor intensive,  with 
human capital being  the crucial factor of production.  The economic miracle of 
Silicon Valley may not be a typical story, but is illustrative of what may take place in 
other expansion areas.   Silicon Valley has probably created more wealth in a 
shorter time period than virtually any other place in history. But, at the same time, 
average wages for low-end workers are 10% lower than a decade ago, while living 
costs are 40% higher than in the rest of the US and housing prices have gone up by   20 
65% since 1995.  The key reason lies in the high tech's heavy reliance on 
outsourcing and subcontracting, a model that helps higher skilled workers thrive, 
able as they are to hop from one employer to another, jacking up their pay in every 
move. But for the less skilled, outsourcing only serves to hold wages down.  This 
gives high-tech firms maximum flexibility in a fast-moving industry. It also creates a 
highly contingent workforce: part-timers, temporary job holders, contract (as well as 
illegal piece-wise) workers, and the self-employed have jumped from 19% of Santa 
Clara's workforce in the Eighties to 42% today  (by contrast, the share of contingent 
workers in the US as a whole has climbed from 27% to 33% in the same period).  
Because the skill gap in high-tech is so vast, the less-skilled employees are likely to 
benefit less from the upward mobility that allows many low-skilled workers to 
achieve middle-class status in the country (see Business Week, March 27, 2000) 
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